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Abstract
This technical report describes the design of a security kernel called
TTCB, which has innovative features. Firstly, it is a distributed subsys-
tem with its own secure network. Secondly, the TTCB is real-time, that
is, a synchronous subsystem capable of timely behavior. These two char-
acteristics together are uncommon in security kernels. Thirdly, the TTCB
can be implemented using only COTS components.
We discuss essentially three things in this paper: (1) The TTCB is a
simple component providing a small set of basic secure services. It aims
at building a new style of protocols to achieve intrusion tolerance, which
for the most part execute in insecure, arbitrary failure environments, and
resort to the TTCB only in crucial parts of their operation. (2) Besides,
the TTCB is a synchronous device supplying functions that may be an
enabler of a new generation of timed secure protocols, until now known to
be fragile due to attacks on timing assumptions. (3) Finally, we present
a design methodology that establishes our hybrid failure assumptions in
a well-founded manner. It helps us to achieve a robust design, despite
using exclusively COTS components, with the advantage of allowing the
security kernel to be easily deployed on widely used platforms.
1 Introduction
We describe the design of a security kernel called Trusted Timely Computing
Base (TTCB). A security kernel is a fail-controlled subsystem trusted to ex-
ecute a few functions correctly, albeit immersed in an environment subjected
to malicious faults. It may be used as an intrusion prevention device, by sup-
porting the mediation/protection of all system interactions, and/or all accesses
to system resources. The reference monitor paradigm is such an example [27].
Alternatively, it may be used as an intrusion tolerance device, by considering
that interactions are performed in unprotected environments, and are subjected
to intrusions. The security kernel intervenes only in crucial phases of execution,
in principle to support intrusion tolerance mechanisms, and as such it can be a
fairly simple component. Intrusion tolerance is the approach taken in the MAF-
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TIA project [35], under which the TTCB is being developed1. The TTCB assists
the implementation of some of the intrusion-tolerant middleware components,
whose architecture and general design principles are described in [44].
The TTCB has innovative features. Firstly, it is a distributed subsystem
with its own secure network. A distributed security kernel represents a ‘hard-
core’ component, oﬀering trusted services to a collection of participants, despite
the fact that the latter reside in diﬀerent nodes, and that their normal com-
munication is through an insecure network. In consequence, the collection of
participants can achieve some degree of distributed trust, for low-level facts re-
ported to/by the TTCB for/to all (and thus agree on them), without having
to explicitly communicate. That is, protocol participants essentially exchange
their messages in a world full of threats, some of them may even be malicious
and cheat, but there is an oracle that correct participants can trust, and a chan-
nel that they can use to get in touch with each other, even for rare moments.
Moreover, this oracle also acts as a checkpoint that malicious participants have
to synchronize with, and this limits their potential for Byzantine actions (in-
consistent value faults).
Secondly, the TTCB is synchronous (or real-time), in the sense of having
reliable clocks and being able to execute timely functions, and obviously do it
in a distributed way: the control channel provides timely (synchronous) inter-
module communication. As such, it is capable, for example, of telling the time,
measuring durations, and detecting timing failures.
Thirdly, the TTCB can be implemented using only COTS components (op-
erating system and hardware). In consequence, all the design guidelines and
the mechanisms we describe in the paper are reproducible and useable in open
settings. As a matter of fact, we are going to make available a prototype of the
TTCB for free non-commercial use, for developers of intrusion-tolerant proto-
cols.
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Figure 1: The architecture of a system with a TTCB
We discuss essentially three things in this paper about our distributed real-
time security kernel:
(1) The TTCB is a simple component providing a small set of basic se-
cure services. It aims at building a new style of protocols to achieve intrusion
1For information, check the MAFTIA home page in www.maftia.org
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tolerance, which for the most part execute in insecure, arbitrary failure environ-
ments, and resort to the TTCB (used here as an oracle and a facilitator) only
in crucial parts of their operation.
(2) The TTCB is a synchronous subsystem supplying time-related functions,
such as timing failure detection, in a trusted way. In consequence, it may be an
enabler of a new generation of timed secure protocols, until now known to be
fragile due to attacks on timing assumptions.
(3) The TTCB follows a design methodology based on a composite fault
model along the attack-vulnerability-intrusion trilogy. The methodology estab-
lishes our hybrid failure assumptions in a well-founded manner, by typifying
faults and assessing coverage. Besides, although the TTCB could be designed
using tamperproof hardware, we show here that high enough coverage can still
be achieved using exclusively COTS components, with the advantage of allowing
the security kernel to be easily deployed on widely used platforms.
In another paper we show how the basic services mentioned above are used to
implement eﬃcient Byzantine-resilient protocols, i.e., intrusion-tolerant proto-
cols [15]. In a previous paper, we had shown how to materialize timed protocols
in uncertain timeliness environments [43].
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the TTCB and
Section 3 gives answers to the question: what is the TTCB good for? The
latter section mentions the security services of the TTCB, therefore the next two
sections describe the design of these services. Section 4 is about the local security
services and Section 5 is about the single distributed security service. Section 6
is about the time services. These three sections are about the functional design
of the services, i.e., of the protocols and algorithms that make they perform
their services. The rest of the paper is about the non-functional design of the
TTCB, i.e., of how the design guarantees the TTCB non-functional properties,
timeliness and security (fail-silent). Section 7 is about the design methodology.
The following section, 8, gives the architecture of the design based on COTS.
Section 9 gives the environment assumptions and the mechanisms that enforce
these assumptions. Section 10 and 11 are respectively about the design of the
network and local TTCB. Section 12 discusses the related work and Section 13
concludes the paper.
2 The TTCB
The TTCB is a secure real-time distributed component that aims to assist the
execution of applications. The architecture of a system with a TTCB is sug-
gested in Figure 1. An architecture with a TTCB has a local module in some
hosts, called the local TTCB. These modules are interconnected by a control
channel. This set up of local TTCBs interconnected by the control channel is
collectively called the TTCB. The TTCB is used to assist protocols and ap-
plications running between participants in the hosts concerned, on any usual
distributed system architecture, encompassing a set of hosts interconnected by
a network (e.g., the Internet). We call the latter the payload system and network,
to diﬀerentiate from the TTCB part.
Conceptually, a local TTCB should be considered to be a module inside a
host, with a well deﬁned interface and separated from the OS. In practice, this
conceptual separation between the local TTCB and the OS can be achieved in
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several ways: (1) the local TTCB can be implemented in a separate, tamper-
proof hardware module —coprocessor, PC board, etc.— and so the separation
is physical; (2) the local TTCB can be implemented on the native hardware,
with a virtual separation and shielding implemented in software, between the
former and the OS processes. The design of the TTCB is discussed later in the
paper.
AN1 Broadcast – The AN has an unreliable packet broadcast primitive (the
sender also receives)
AN2 Integrity – Nodes can detect if packets were corrupted in the network.
Corruptions are converted to omission failures
AN3 Omission degree – No more than Od omissions may occur in a given
interval of time
AN4 Bounded delay – Any correct packet is received within a maximum
delay Tsend from the send request
AN5 Partition free – The network does not get partitioned
AN6 Broadcast Degree – If a broadcast is received by any local TTCB
other than the sender, then it is received by at least Bd local TTCBs
AN7 Conﬁdentiality – The content of network traﬃc cannot be read by
unauthorized users
AN8 Authenticity – Nodes can detect if a packet was broadcast by a cor-
rect node
Table 1: Abstract Network properties.
The local TTCBs are assumed to be fail-silent (they fail by crashing). The
TTCB cannot produce erroneous interactions or results (even on account of
attacks). Every local TTCB has a clock and the clocks are synchronized: the
clock values of correct processes at any real-time t diﬀer by at most a known
constant π, the precision of the clock set.
The TTCB control channel has well-deﬁned characteristics, speciﬁed in Ta-
ble 1 as a set of abstract network properties, on which the design of the internal
protocols relies. In this way the control channel does not have to rely on a
speciﬁc network technology: the abstract network can be mapped onto diﬀerent
networks with the assistance of simple adaptation mechanisms.
The TTCB oﬀers two sets of services, listed in Table 2, which any component
(protocol, application) in the local host can use. These services are described
with detail in [33]. In the table and throughout the paper we use the word entity
to denominate any software component that calls the TTCB (process, thread,
etc.).
3 Intrusion Tolerance with the TTCB
Before we delve into the discussion of these services, a pertinent question at
this stage is: What is the TTCB good for? This question is best answered after
explaining the failure assumptions followed in the MAFTIA architecture.
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Security services
Local authentication For an entity to authenticate the TTCB and
establish a secure channel with it.
Trusted block agreement Achieves agreement on a small, ﬁxed size,
block of data.
Trusted random number generation Generates trustworthy random numbers.
Time services
Trusted timely execution Executes operations securely and within a cer-
tain interval of time.
Trusted duration measurement Measures the duration of the execution of an
operation.
Trusted timing failure detection Checks if an operation is executed during an
interval of time.
Trusted absolute timestamping Provides globally meaningful timestamps.
Table 2: TTCB Services
3.1 Fault Model
A crucial aspect of any fault-tolerant architecture is the fault model upon which
the system architecture is conceived, and component interactions are deﬁned.
Controlled failure assumptions specify qualitative and quantitative bounds
on component failures, representing very well how common systems work under
the presence of accidental faults. However, it is traditionally diﬃcult to model
the behavior of an intruder, so we have a problem of coverage that does not
recommend this approach unless a solution can be found.
Arbitrary failure assumptions, on the other hand, specify no qualitative or
quantitative bounds on the component’s possible failures. Arbitrary failure
assumptions are costly to handle, in terms of performance and complexity, and
thus are not compatible with the user requirements of the vast majority of
today’s on-line applications.
Hybrid assumptions, combining both kinds of failure assumptions, are fol-
lowed in our work. Generally, they consist of allocating diﬀerent assumptions to
diﬀerent subsets or components of the system, and have been used in a number
of systems and protocols [32, 34, 45].
With hybrid assumptions some parts of the system would be justiﬁably as-
sumed to exhibit fail-controlled behavior, whilst the remainder of the system
would still be allowed an arbitrary behavior. This is advantageous in modular
and distributed system architectures subjected to malicious faults.
However, such an approach is only feasible when the fault model is well-
founded, that is, the behavior assumed for every single subset of the system can
be modeled and/or enforced with high coverage. As a matter of fact, a system
normally fails by its weakest link, and naive assumptions about a component’s
behavior will be easy prey to hackers.
The implementation of the TTCB discussed in Sections 10 and 11 combines
diﬀerent techniques and methods tackling diﬀerent classes of faults, in order to
achieve the postulated behavior (fail-silent) with high coverage.
3.2 Strategy for Intrusion Tolerance
With the TTCB, we can implement intrusion-tolerance mechanisms, on a hybrid
of arbitrary-failure (the payload system) and fail-silent (the TTCB) components.
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The TTCB is designed to assist crucial steps of the operation of middleware pro-
tocols. We use the word “crucial” to stress the tolerance aspect: unlike classical,
prevention-based approaches (e.g., Reference Monitor), the component does not
stand in the way of all resources and operations. As a matter of fact, protocols
run in an untrusted environment, local participants only trust interactions with
the (trusted) security kernel, single components can be intruded, and correct
service provision is built on distributed fault tolerance mechanisms, for example
through agreement and replication amongst collections of participants in several
hosts.
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Figure 2: Intrusion Tolerance with a TTCB
Observe Figure 2: software components Ci interact through protocols which
run on the payload system (the top arrows). However, they can locally access
the TTCB in some steps of their execution (for example, to be informed whether
a message just received was or not corrupted). The white colour is used to mean
a trusted environment (the TTCB). The key means the environment is crypto-
graphically secure. The grey colours for the payload system mean untrusted.
The time-related issues depicted in the ﬁgure will be discussed in Section 6.
Trusting the TTCB security kernel means the following: it is not feasible to
subvert the TTCB, but it may be possible to interfere in its interaction with
entities. In similar terms, whilst we let a local host be compromised, we must
make sure that it does not undermine fault-tolerant operation of the protocols
amongst distributed components.
The above implies two things: the operation of protocols can be intruded
upon and individual components can be corrupted (e.g., Ck); and special care
must be taken in order to preserve the validity of the interactions of a correct en-
tity with its local TTCB. The reader is referred to [15], where we give a practical
example of the use of the TTCB to implement intrusion-tolerant protocols.
4 TTCB Local Security Services
This section describes the local security-related services of the TTCB (Local Au-
thentication Service and Random Number Generation Service) and the entity–
TTCB communication.
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4.1 Local Authentication Service
The purpose of the Local Authentication Service is to allow the entity to au-
thenticate and establish a secure channel with a local TTCB. The need for this
service derives from the fact that, in general, the communication path between
the entity and the local TTCB is not trustworthy. For instance, that communi-
cation is probably made through the operating system that may be corrupted
and behave maliciously. We assume that the entity–local TTCB communica-
tion can be subject to passive and active attacks [31]. A call to the TTCB is
composed of two messages, a request and a reply, that can be read, modiﬁed,
reordered, deleted, and replayed.
Every local TTCB has an asymmetric key pair (Ku,Kr) that is used to au-
thenticate it. The entity that calls the Local Authentication Service is assumed
to have an authentic copy of the local TTCB public key Ku. These public keys
can be distributed, for instance, manually or using a Public Key Infrastructure
(PKI). The private key Kr is assumed to be known only by the local TTCB.
A secure channel is obtained establishing a shared symmetric key Ket between
the entity and the local TTCB, that is later used to secure their communication
(Section 4.3).
The protocol to establish the shared secret has to be an authenticated key es-
tablishment protocol with local TTCB authentication. Such a protocol is deﬁned
by the following properties [31]:
• SK1 Implicit Key Authentication. The entity and the TTCB know that no other
entity has the key.
• SK2 Key Conﬁrmation. Both the entity and the TTCB know that the other
has the key.
• SK3 Authentication. The entity has to authenticate the local TTCB.
• SK4 Trusted Against Known-Key Attacks. Compromise of past keys does not
allow either (1) a passive adversary to compromise future keys, or (2) imperson-
ation by an active adversary2.
A simple protocol with properties SK1 through SK4 can be implemented
with two messages, i.e., a single function call. Figure 3 shows the protocol. The
proof of the protocol is in Appendix A.
Action Description
1 P → T 〈Eu(Ket, Xe)〉 The entity sends the TTCB the new key Ket and a
challenge Xe, both encrypted with the local TTCB
public key Ku
2 T → P 〈Sr(Xe)〉 TTCB sends the entity the signature of the challenge
obtained with its private key Kr
Figure 3: Local Authentication Service protocol
The protocol requires the entity to generate the key Ket. Although we
would desire the key to be generated by the local TTCB, there is no key that
2A passive adversary “attempts to defeat a cryptographic technique by simply recording
data and thereafter analyzing it (e.g., in key establishment, to determine the key). An active
attack involves an adversary who modiﬁes or injects messages.” [31]
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the TTCB can use to protect and give Ket to the entity. Therefore Ket has to
be generated by the entity but in such a way that a malicious OS cannot guess
or disclose it. The generation of a random key requires sources of randomness
(timing between key hits and interrupts, mouse position, etc.), sources that
in mainstream computers are controlled by the OS. This means that when an
entity gets allegedly random data from those sources, it may get either data
given or known by a potentially malicious OS. Therefore, there is the possibility
of a malicious OS being able to guess the random data that will be used by
the entity to generate the key, and consequently, the key itself. This problem is
hard to handle. A set of criteria can help to mitigate it:
• the entity should use as much as possible sources of random data not controlled
by the OS.
• The entity should use as much diﬀerent sources of random data as possible.
Even if an attacker manages to corrupt the OS, it will probably not be able to
corrupt its code in many diﬀerent places and in such a synchronized way, so that
it may guess the random number.
• The entity must use a strong mixing function, i.e., a function that produces an
output whose bits are uncorrelated to the input bits [20]. An example is a hash
function such as MD4 or MD5.
Although this may seam limitative, for most applications it is reasonable
to take some initial time to obtain a random number. In runtime, this will in
general be unacceptable and that is why it is useful to have the Random Number
Generation Service, that gives reliable random numbers, provided that a secure
channel was previously established. A ﬁnal comment: the protocol challenge
should also be generated randomly using the same set of criteria.
The Local Authentication Service protocol is implemented in the TTCB API
as a single call with the following syntax:
eid, chllg sign ← TTCB localAuthentication(key, protection, challenge)
The input parameters are the key, the communication protection to be used
(see Section 4.3), and the challenge. The input parameters are encrypted with
the local TTCB public key. The output parameters are the entity identiﬁcation
–eid– used to identify the entity in the subsequent calls, and the signature of
the challenge, obtained using the local TTCB private key.
4.2 Random Number Generation Service
The Trusted Random Number Generation service supplies uniformly distributed
random numbers. These numbers are basic for building cryptographic primitives
such as authentication protocols. If the numbers are not really random, those
algorithms can be vulnerable.
The interface of the service has only one function that returns a random
number:
number ← TTCB getRandom()
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In a future version of the TTCB, based on a appliance board, we envisage
the use of a hardware random number generator, since it can give better random
numbers. In the current RT-Linux TTCB, the random numbers are given by
Linux /dev/random device. This device works with an entropy pool that collects
random data from several inputs: device driver noise, timing between key hits,
timing between some interrupts, mouse position, timing between disk accesses,
etc. When a random number is requested, a hash of the entropy poll is calculated
using MD5.
4.3 Entity-TTCB Secure Channel
The communication between an entity and the local TTCB is protected by a
secure channel, based on the existence of the shared key Ket. It is reason-
able to consider that entities can have diﬀerent security requirements for this
communication. Therefore, when the Local Authentication Service is called,
the parameter protection is used to select one of three protection modes below.
(The same parameter is also used to select encryption and hashing algorithms,
if necessary.)
1. Authenticity only. In particular situations or system architectures, an entity
may be able to communicate securely with its local TTCB. This may be the
case if the entity is the OS itself, or if the local TTCB is called through an I/O
port. Therefore, the secure channel has only to guarantee the authenticity of
calls to the local TTCB, i.e., that the service is being called by the entity whose
eid comes in the call.
2. Authenticity and integrity. The entity requires only that the communication
integrity is guaranteed.
3. Authenticity, integrity and conﬁdentiality. The entity requires not only that
the communication integrity is guaranteed but also that its content cannot be
disclosed.
In the ﬁrst mode, authenticity is guaranteed putting the key Ket together
with the eid in the messages sent from the entity to the local TTCB. This
allows the TTCB to authenticate the caller entity. Attacks against authenticity
in the second and third modes of protection are handled including the eid in
the message. Together with the Message Integrity Code (MIC) used to enforce
integrity, this authenticates the message.
Ensuring the message integrity – second and third modes – is more complex.
Below is a list of the possible attacks and how each one is handled:
• Modiﬁcation. Message modiﬁcation is detected using a Message Integrity Code
(MIC). The algorithm used to obtain the MIC is deﬁned using the parameter
protection. The algorithm can be, for example: “calculate a hash of the message
using SHA-1 and encrypt it with 3DES”. If the local TTCB detects that a request
message was corrupted, it returns an error. If an entity detects a corrupted reply
message, it simply discards it. There is no point in resending messages since
modiﬁcations have a high probability of having a malicious causer and there is
a high probability that this causer is able to corrupt any number of resends.
Therefore, these situations have to be solved by the entity.
• Replay. Every request message includes a sequence number. The corresponding
reply includes the same number. Therefore, both the local TTCB and the entity
9
know if the message they received is the one it should be or a replay. Replay
are simply dropped.
• Reorder. The reorder of messages is detected and handled as replays.
• Deletion. If a message is deleted the entity will not receive the response to a
call it made. This case has to be handled by the entity (e.g., using a timeout to
detect if its communication with the local TTCB is attacked).
Conﬁdentiality (third mode) is enforced encrypting the message with the key
Ket.
5 TTCB Distributed Security Services
Distributed services are services that require the cooperation of several local
TTCBs for their execution. This section describes the only TTCB distributed
security-related service— the Trusted Block Agreement service— but a funda-
mental one. The remainder distributed services are time-related, such as Timing
Failure Detection [11], and will be brieﬂy addressed in Section 6.
5.1 The Trusted Block Agreement Service
The Trusted Block Agreement Service (Agreement Service for short) performs
agreement protocols between sets of entities. These protocols, for instance mul-
ticast or consensus with a majority decision, are executed in a secure and timely
fashion, since the service runs inside the TTCB. The service is not supposed to
replace agreement protocols in the payload system: it works with “small” blocks
of data (currently 160 bits), and the TTCB has limited resources to execute it.
The Agreement Service is formally deﬁned in terms of the three functions
TTCB propose, TTCB decide and decision. A entity is said to propose a
value when it calls TTCB propose. A entity decides a result when it calls
TTCB decide and receives back a result. The function decision deﬁnes how
the result is calculated in terms of the inputs of the service. The result is com-
posed by a value and some additional information that will be described below.
Formally, the Agreement Service is deﬁned by the following properties:
• Termination. Every correct entity eventually decides a result.
• Integrity. Every correct entity decides at most one result.
• Agreement. If a correct entity decides result, then all correct entities eventually
decide result.
• Validity. If a correct entity decides result then result is obtained applying the
function decision to the values proposed.
• Timeliness. Given an instant tstart and a known constant Tagreement, a process
can decide by tstart+ Tagreement.
It is important to note that Timeliness is a property valid only at the TTCB
interface. An entity can only decide with the timeliness the payload system
permits.
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The interface of the Agreement Service has two functions, TTCB propose
and TTCB decide, that correspond to those in the deﬁnition. An entity calls
TTCB propose to propose its value and TTCB decide to try to decide a result
(TTCB decide is non-blocking and returns an error if the agreement did not
terminate).
out ← TTCB propose(eid, elist, tstart, decision, value)
result ← TTCB decide(eid, tag)
We use the expression an agreement to denominate an execution of the
Agreement Service. An agreement is uniquely identiﬁed by three parameters:
elist (the list of entities involved in the agreement), tstart (a timestamp), and
decision (a constant identifying the decision function). The service terminates
at most Tagreement after it “starts”, i.e., after either: (1) the last entity in elist
proposed; or (2) after tstart. That shows the meaning of tstart : it is the in-
stant at which an agreement “starts” despite the number of entities in elist that
proposed. If the TTCB receives a propose after tstart it returns an error.
Let us see the other parameters, starting with TTCB propose. eid is the
unique identiﬁcation of an entity before the TTCB, obtained using the Local
Authentication Service. value is the block the entity proposes. out is a struc-
ture with two ﬁelds: error, an error code; and tag, an unique identiﬁer of the
agreement before a local TTCB. An entity calls TTCB decide with the tag
that identiﬁes the agreement that it wants to decide. result is a record with four
ﬁelds: (1) error, an error code; (2) value, the value decided; (3) proposed-ok,
a mask with one bit per entity in elist, where each bit indicates if the corre-
sponding entity proposed the value that was decided or not; (4) proposed-any,
a similar mask that indicates which entities proposed any value.
Currently we deﬁned only a few decision functions:
• TTCB TBA RMULTICAST. This function, on one hand, is a reliable multicast
since the entities decide the value proposed by the ﬁrst entity in elist (the others
may not propose a value at all). On the other hand, the function also compares
the value decided with the values proposed by the other entities (if any) and
returns the masks proposed-ok and proposed-any.
• TTCB TBA MAJORITY. This function returns the value proposed more times
and the two masks.
• TTCB TBA TEQUALITY. This function compares the values proposed. The
entities that proposed the value more proposed decide the result with the masks.
The others receive an error.
5.2 Agreement Service Protocol
This section describes an Agreement Service protocol. The protocol is time-
triggered: TTCB propose is called asynchronously, and gives the TTCB data
that is stored in tables; then, periodically that data is broadcast to all local
TTCBs and, also periodically, data is read from the network and processed.
The protocol uses two tables. The dataTable stores all agreements data.
Each record has the state of one agreement with the format: (tag, elist, tstart,
decision, vtable). All ﬁelds have the usual meaning except vtable, which is a
table with the values proposed (one per entity in elist). sendTable stores data
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For each local TTCB
propose routine
1 when entity calls TTCB propose(eid, elist, tstart, decision, value) do
2 if (entity already proposed) or (eid /∈ elist) or (clock() > tstart) then return error;
3 insert (elist, tstart, decision, eid, value) in sendTable;
4 get R ∈ dataTable : R.elist = elist ∧ R.tstart = tstart ∧ R.decision = decision;
5 if (R = ⊥) then R := (get tag(), elist, tstart, decision, ⊥); insert R in dataTable;
6 return R.tag;
broadcast routine
7 when clock() = rounds × Ts do
8 repeat Od+ 1 times do broadcast(sendTable);
9 sendTable := ⊥; rounds := rounds + 1;
receive routine
10 when clock() = roundr × Tr do
11 while (read(M) = error) do
12 foreach (elist, tstart, decision, eid, value) ∈ M.sendTable do
13 get R ∈ dataTable : R.elist = elist ∧ R.tstart = tstart ∧ R.decision = decision;
14 if (R = ⊥) then R := (get tag(), elist, tstart, decision, ⊥); insert R in dataTable;
15 insert value in R.vtable;
16 roundr := roundr + 1;
decide routine
17 when entity calls TTCB decide(tag) do
18 get R ∈ dataTable : R.tag = tag;
19 if (R = ⊥) and [(clock() > R.tstart + Tagreement) or (all entities proposed a value)] then
20 return (calculate result using function R.decision and values in R.vtable);
21 else return error;
Figure 4: Agreement Service internal protocol. Instance at a local TTCB.
to be broadcast to all local TTCBs. Every record is a proposal with the format:
(elist, tstart, decision, eid, value). The agreement is identiﬁed by (elist, tstart,
decision). eid identiﬁes the entity that proposed and value is the value proposed.
Figure 4 shows the protocol. It is based on TTCB assumptions that we
summarize here for clearness: (1) the local TTCBs have clocks synchronized to
π; (2) the protocol code is executed in real-time (therefore there is a worst case
execution time for every section of code); (3) every local TTCB communicates
with the others exclusively by broadcasting a message with a constant period;
(4) the network is described by the Abstract Network model (Table 1).
The protocol has four routines. The propose routine is executed when an
entity calls the TTCB function TTCB propose (Lines 1-6). The routine begins
doing some tests: if the entity already proposed a value for this agreement; if
the entity that calls the service is in elist ; if tstart already expired (Line 2).
Other tests, are also made but are not represented since they are not related
to the algorithm functionality. If the propose is accepted, its data is inserted
in sendTable and dataTable, and the tag is returned (Lines 3-6). The broadcast
routine broadcasts data to all local TTCBs every Ts (the period) either if there is
data in sendTable or not (Lines 7-9). Every message is broadcasted Od+1 times
in order to tolerate omissions in the network (Od is the omission degree). After
the broadcast, sendTable is cleaned. The receive routine reads and processes
messages every Tr (Lines 10-16). Since each message is broadcasted Od + 1
times, copies of the same message have to be discarded by the function read
(Line 11). For each message received, the data in each record of sendTable is
inserted in dataTable (Lines 12-15). The decide routine is executed when an
entity calls the function TTCB decide. The routine searches dataTable for the
agreement identiﬁed by the tag and returns an error if it does not exists. If the
instant tstart + Tagreement passed or the local TTCB has the values proposed
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by all entities in elist, the result is obtained and returned.
In Appendix A we prove that the protocol implements the Agreement Service
and that Tagreement can be given by:
Tagreement = Ts +WCETsend + Tsend + Tr +WCETreceive + π (1)
The constants in the formula have the following meaning: Ts and Tr are
respectively the send and receive periods; WCETsend and WCETreceive are
respectively the send and receive routines worst execution times; Tsend is the
maximum communication delay; π is the precision of the clock synchronization
algorithm.
5.3 Agreement Service Protocol With Local TTCB Crashes
In the Agreement Service protocol in Figure 4, if a local TTCB crashes during
the broadcast, some local TTCBs may receive the message while others may not.
Such an inconsistency can lead to diﬀerent local TTCBs giving diﬀerent results
to one or more agreements. Therefore, informally, when the sender crashes, the
broadcast must either deliver the message to all recipients or to none. Such a
broadcast is usually called a Reliable Broadcast and this section describes such a
protocol. If we replace lines 8 and 11 in Figure 4 by this protocol, the Agreement
Service protocol becomes tolerant to local TTCB crashes. The second condition
in Line 19 has also to be substituted by: “all entities in non-crashed local TTCBs
proposed a value”. The complete protocol is shown in Appendix B.
This section presents a time-triggered Timely Reliable Broadcast that tol-
erates crashes, assumes channel omissions (Abstract Network property AN3),
and is lightweight, in the sense that it does not retransmit messages. A timely
reliable broadcast is formally deﬁned in terms of two primitives R-broadcast (M)
and R-deliver (M), where M is the message, that verify the following properties
(based on [22]):
• Validity. If a correct local TTCB R-broadcasts M then it eventually R-delivers
M .
• Agreement. If a correct local TTCB R-delivers message M then all correct local
TTCBs eventually R-deliver M .
• Integrity. For any message M , a correct local TTCB R-delivers M at most once
and only if M was R-broadcast by sender (M).
• Timeliness. There is a known constant Tbroadcast such that, if a message is
R-broadcast at instant t, then no correct local TTCB R-delivers M after t +
Tbroadcast.
The protocol is shown in Figure 5. The broadcast routine is similar to the
Agreement Service protocol. Every Ts a messageM is broadcasted Od+1 times
to tolerate omissions in the channel. The message is broadcasted even if there is
no data to be sent. This is important for the protocol to work properly and for
the detection of local TTCB crashes (a local TTCB is known to be crashed if a
message is not received by its deadline [11]). The message has an header with the
sender identiﬁer, a sequence number and the table higherseqVector. This table
has an entry for every local TTCB that contains, for every other local TTCB,
13
For each local TTCB
broadcast routine
1 when clock() = rounds × Ts do
2 sender := my id(); seq := rounds;
3 M := (sender, seq, higherseqVector, data);
4 repeat Od+ 1 times do broadcast(M);
5 rounds := rounds + 1;
receive routine
6 when clock() = roundr × Tr do
7 while (read(M) = error) do
8 foreach M-ndlv in notDelivered do
9 if [(M-ndlv.sender = M.sender) and (M-ndlv.number < M.number)] or
(M-ndlv.number < M.higherseqVector[M-ndlv.sender]) then
10 R-deliver(M-ndlv.data); remove M-ndlv from notDelivered;
11 if (higherseqVector[M.sender] > M.number) then R-deliver(M.data);
12 else put M in notDelivered; higherseqVector[M.sender] := M.number;
13 roundr := roundr + 1;
Figure 5: Timely reliable broadcast protocol.
the highest sequence number of a message received from that local TTCB. The
receive routine starts by reading a message M (Lines 6-13). Copies of messages
already received are discarded by the function read. For every message received
the routine does two things: (1) tests if previously received but not R-delivered
messages (stored in notDelivered) can be R-delivered (Lines 8-10); (2) tests if
M can be R-delivered (Lines 11-12).
Considering AN6, the protocol tolerates Bd local TTCB crashes in a refer-
ence interval of time. A message can be R-delivered by a local TTCB when it
knows that all other non-crashed local TTCBs will also R-deliver it (Agreement
property). A local TTCB can R-deliver a message M(s, n) when it receives (a)
M(s, n+ 1) or (b) M(s′, n′) with higherseqVector[s]=n+1 (s is the sender and
n the message number). The intuition behind this is: if s crashes during the
broadcast ofM(s, n+1) but at least one local TTCB receives the message, then
at least Bd local TTCBs receive it (AN6) and at most other Bd−1 can crash (the
protocol tolerates Bd crashes). Therefore, at least one correct local TTCB re-
ceivesM(s, n+1) and broadcastsM(s ′, n ′) with higherseqVector[s]=n+1 to the
other non-crashed local TTCBs. Since messages are broadcast Od+1 times, all
non-crashed local TTCBs either receive M(s, n+1) or M(s ′, n ′) and R-deliver
M(s, n). In the protocol, Line 9 tests this condition. However, it considers that
anyM(s, n+) with n+ > n causesM(s, n) to be R-delivered, since the Abstract
Network does not guarantee the order of the reception of messages. The same
is true for M(s ′, n ′) with higherseqVector[s] > n. Line 11 checks if the message
received, M(s ′′, n ′′), can be R-delivered immediately. This is the case if a mes-
sage from the same sender but with a higher number was received previously,
i.e., if higherseqVector[s ′′] > n ′′.
In Appendix A we prove these results and also that the protocol R-delivers
a message M within Tbroadcast of R-broadcast(M) (the meaning of the constants
is the same as before):
Tbroadcast = 2× (WCETsend + Tsend + Tr +WCETreceive + Ts) + π (2)
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The Agreement Service termination instant is related to Tbroadcast:
Tagreement = Ts + Tbroadcast (3)
The proof of this result is in the Appendix A.
6 TTCB Time Services
This section addresses the time-related services of the TTCB. The latter are
discussed with detail in [33]. Due to lack of space, we brieﬂy underline the
potential of these services.
In order to understand the assumptions on timeliness of our system, let us
go back to Figure 2: the clock inside the TTCB area is meant to suggest it
is a fully synchronous (or hard real-time) component. On the other hand, the
warped clock in the payload area suggests that it has uncertain timeliness, or
partial synchronism. It can even be asynchronous.
This is a realistic assumption for Internet-based operation, but constructing
timed protocols in environments of uncertain timeliness is known to be a hard
task. We have already shown [43, 12] how to use the services provided by a
timely computing base to solve such problems. The solution lies on the adequate
interaction of an essentially asynchronous system with a synchronous subsystem
(interface), so as to determine interesting facts about time (services).
Constructing secure timed protocols is an even harder task, due to the risk
of attacks on the timing assumptions. For that reason, most known secure
broadcast or Byzantine agreement protocols are of the asynchronous class. In
the TTCB work, we extend the resilience of the aforementioned time services,
to ensure that they can be trusted despite the presence of malicious faults. In
summary, the TTCB time services are:
• Trusted timely execution. This service executes operations securely and within
a certain interval of time. It can be useful to run operations that are critical, in
terms of security and/or time, in a secure and timely way.
• Trusted duration measurement. This service measures the duration of the exe-
cution of an operation, or a sequence of similar operations. It can be useful for
instance to help in the detection of attacks against performance or QoS, such as
denial-of-service attacks.
• Trusted timing failure detection. This service detects if a timed operation fails,
i.e., if an operation – local or remote – fails to be executed within an interval of
time. If so, a function can be timely executed to handle the failure exception.
This service can be extremely important to detect and handle attacks that try
to break timeliness assumptions of protocols.
• Trusted absolute timestamping. This service provides globally meaningful times-
tamps. The service is important to implement security systems that rely on
reliable timestamps given by synchronized clocks, e.g., Kerberos. Intrusion-
tolerant protocols based on the TTCB security-related services also need these
timestamps [15].
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In consequence, we end-up with an environment where the TTCB, with the
security-related and time-related services combined, can support the construc-
tion of secure and timed protocols.
7 TTCB Design Methodology
This section describes our design methodology. As any design, it has functional
and non-functional aspects. The functional aspects are mainly concerned with
the algorithms and protocols that make the system perform its service (discussed
in Sections 4 and 5), and the necessary adaptations to the environment to ensure
it has the run-time functionality assumed by those protocols, for instance, the
abstract network. We brieﬂy discuss the latter, and concentrate on the non-
functional aspects.
Design Principles of a Security Kernel
The construction of a security kernel like the TTCB is based on three design
principles:
• Interposition: it must by construction be interposed between vital resources and
any attempt to interact with them.
• Shielding: the TTCB construction is such that it itself is protected (1) from
faults aﬀecting timeliness and (2) from faults aﬀecting security, i.e., timing
faults, attacks and intrusions.
• Validation: the TTCB functionality is simple enough to be based on veriﬁable
mechanisms with relation both to timeliness and security.
The “vital resources” mentioned in Interposition are those resources needed
for the TTCB itself to behave as speciﬁed, i.e., timely and securely. Shielding
substantiates the principle that attacks against the inside of the TTCB are
prevented from being successful. The design principle of Validation implies that
the TTCB design and implementation has, in some sense, to be “simple”, so
that it can be veriﬁed and justiﬁably claimed correct. For example, the number
of lines of code and the amount of data that it handles have to be limited; the
structure of internal procedures and protocol should be simple.
Composite fault model with hybrid failure assumptions
The organization of assumptions in terms of a composite fault model [44] un-
derpins our design philosophy. In MAFTIA, we say that the impairments that
may occur to a system, security-wise, have to do with a wealth of causes, which
range from internal faults (i.e., vulnerabilities), to external, interaction faults
(i.e., attacks) which activate those vulnerabilities, producing faults (i.e., intru-
sions) that can directly lead to component failure.
The composite fault model is shown in Figure 6. The ﬁgure also shows where
to apply diﬀerent techniques to prevent the system from failing. Because we
diﬀerentiated the several fault classes, we can apply these techniques selectively,
and in a structured way.
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Note for example, that an intrusion cannot occur unless there is a vulnera-
bility to be activated by a corresponding attack (it makes no sense to prevent
an attack for which there is no vulnerability, or vice-versa).
Intruder/
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tolerance
intrusion 
prevention
Intruder
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Figure 6: The Composite Fault Model of MAFTIA
A composite fault model with hybrid failure assumptions is one where the
presence and severity of vulnerabilities, attacks and intrusions varies from com-
ponent to component.
Consider a component or sub-system like the TTCB, for which a given con-
trolled failure assumption was made. How can we achieve coverage of such an
assumption, given the unpredictability of attacks and the elusiveness of vulner-
abilities?
The ﬁrst-line techniques are vulnerability prevention (e.g., using correct cod-
ing practices), and then attack prevention (e.g., physically isolating an access
point) and vulnerability removal (e.g., patching the OS and removing absolute
privileges from the root account).
All these techniques contribute to intrusion prevention. However, after this
step there may still be attack-vulnerability combinations to fear from (illustrated
in the ﬁgure, by the holes in the intrusion prevention barrier). The design must
then be complemented with the necessary intrusion tolerance measures, for ex-
ample, using intrusion detection and recovery or masking, until we justiﬁably
achieve conﬁdence that the component behaves as assumed, failing in the as-
sumed controlled manner, i.e., the component is trustworthy. The measure of
its trustworthiness is the coverage of the controlled failure assumption.
7.1 The Methodology
The design of the TTCB with regard to the non-functional properties follows
the principles underlined above. The methodology has ﬁve steps. It makes sense
to perform several iterations until the ﬁnal result.
1. Deﬁne the desired system (TTCB) failure modes
2. Deﬁne the architecture and the environment assumptions
3. Design the adaptation mechanisms that enforce the environment assumptions
4. Design the mechanisms and protocols that enforce the system failure modes
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5. Assess the system design
6. Iterate until successful
Step one is the deﬁnition of the TTCB failure modes. Recall that we consider
the local TTCBs to be fail-silent, and consider the inter-TTCB communication
system to also be fail-silent. The interposition and shielding principles provide
a clear framework, to orient the design in order to achieve these objectives.
Step two starts with the deﬁnition of the architecture of the system, i.e.,
its topology, its main components and their interaction. The architecture itself
can prevent some attacks against speciﬁc components. For example, the control
network being physically inaccessible to hackers. The environment on which the
TTCB runs is also deﬁned. The environment is what is external to the system
being designed but that interacts with it: host hardware and OS, networks,
attackers, etc.
Further to typifying the technologies used (the real environment), we may
create an abstract model of parts of the environment, on top of which the system
is implemented. This allows us to achieve some independence from the real
environment (enhancing portability), and/or to improve it some (simplifying
higher-level mechanisms). We do that for the control channel, whose abstract
network properties we deﬁned in Table 1, and the third step consists of building
the necessary adaptation mechanisms to meet abstraction with reality.
Step four deals with constructing the mechanisms and protocols which en-
force the fail-silent behavior of the TTCB, on the assumed environment and
architecture. The design methodology may recursively be applied to the inter-
nal components of the TTCB as part of this step.
Step ﬁve consists in assessing the system design, or in this case, the TTCB
subsystem. On the one hand, determining whether the coverage of the design
assumptions is acceptably high. On the other hand, determining whether given
the assumptions, the algorithmics and their implementation provide the speci-
ﬁed services. The veriﬁcation of the TTCB is on-going work in the context of
the MAFTIA project, and will be the subject of future reports.
The following sections apply this methodology to the design of the TTCB,
as a component with controlled failure assumptions. The generic system archi-
tecture and the fault model of the TTCB were introduced in Section 2, and
the TTCB architecture is detailed in Section 8. Section 9 presents the environ-
ment assumptions and discusses some mechanisms to enforce them. Sections 10
and 11 discusses the design of the control channel and of the local TTCB in
view of securing the assumed behavior. For completeness, recall that Sections 4
and 5 have described the functional design of the TTCB.
8 Architecture
The overall architecture is quite simple: local TTCBs interconnected by a (pri-
vate) control network.
For very high coverage, local TTCBs would normally be built on dedicated
tamperproof hardware modules with a dedicated network attachment, such that
the modules can be plugged with the proper physical isolation into the host
hardware. However, in this paper we show a design based on the very COTS
hardware and software which runs the payload system (e.g. PCs with Linux),
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with isolation implemented in software. This provides the opportunity to show
the eﬀectiveness of our structured design methodology. The local architecture
of the software-based solution consists of a small secure real-time kernel running
on the bare machine hardware, on top of which the regular operating system
runs (and all the rest of the host software). The local TTCB is basically a
privileged and highly protected set of real-time tasks of that kernel.
For the kernel, we use a general purpose real-time executive, RT-Linux, based
on a modiﬁed Linux kernel [9, 46]. This approach has the advantage of running
Linux and Linux applications on top of it, but it controls all hardware resources
in order to safeguard the timeliness of real-time tasks, which are used to sup-
port the TTCB. As a disadvantage, it can be as insecure as Linux. The TTCB
is built on the RT-Linux kernel, and in consequence, our design concentrates
mainly on securing the abovementioned design principles that make-up a trust-
worthy implementation of a security kernel— interposition and shielding— and
discussing the validation of that work. Note that the coverage expected from
this conﬁguration cannot be worse than hardened versions of known commercial
operating systems, since it only addresses the inner kernel and not the operating
system as a whole. It may thus constitute a very attractive implementation for
open use, for its cost/simplicity/resilience trade-oﬀ.
The control channel can also assume several forms exhibiting diﬀerent levels
of timeliness and resilience. On a timeliness side, it should be observed that the
bandwidth required of the control channel is bound to be much smaller than that
of the payload channel. To pursue the COTS strategy, our architecture is based
on fast Ethernet, for campus-wide systems: we provide each host having a TTCB
with an extra LAN adapter. In more demanding scenarios w.r.t. scale, one may
resort to alternative networks (e.g., VPNs over ISDN or ADSL connections,
GSM or UMTS Short Message Service).
9 Environment Assumptions
This section describes the environment assumptions, and the adaptation mech-
anisms needed to enforce them. The environment has standard PCs with RT-
Linux (the hosts), access to the Internet through regular Ethernet (payload
network), and a dedicated Fast-Ethernet (control channel). Hosts have two net-
work devices: one for the payload network, another for the control channel. The
environment assumptions are shown in Table 3.
Assumptions A1 and A2 impose limits on what the attacker can do inside a
host. Assumption A3 states essentially that the host will never become unstable
due to accidental execution faults. Assumptions A4 and A5 impose limits on
what the attacker can do to the control channel. Assumptions A6 and A7
deﬁne the behavior of the control channel vis-a-vis accidental faults: a controlled
omission degree, and a partition-free network environment, respectively.
The interposition principle is essentially achieved by the RT-Linux architec-
ture, whereby the RT-Linux-TTCB kernel compound takes control of all vital
resources, intercepting all accesses and interactions (including all interrupts and
interrupt handling instructions, such as disable/enable interrupts) coming from
the rest of the host, and managing all packets coming from the networks.
Assumptions A1, A2, A4, and A5, aim at justifying the shielding princi-
ple. Assumption A3 is directly concerned with stating that the interposition of
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A1 The host protection mechanisms cannot be reconﬁgured by any attacker.
A2 The host kernel memory cannot be read or written by any attacker.
A3 The host is fail-silent in the presence of accidental faults.
A4 The control channel access point cannot be read or written by any at-
tacker.
A5 The data on the control channel cannot be read or written by any attacker.
A6 Given a known interval of time, the control channel does not corrupt more
than k packets.
A7 There are no partitions in the control channel.
Table 3: Environment assumptions.
the RT-Linux-TTCB compound between the vital hardware and the other pro-
cesses, remains valid in the occurrence of accidental faults. Indirectly, it is also
concerned with the shielding principle, by stating that in the same situation, it
will not become at the mercy of an attacker.
RT-Linux and protection
We start describing RT-Linux and discussing related protection issues. RT-
Linux [9, 46] is an engineering of Linux, which was modiﬁed in order that a
real-time executive takes control of the hardware, in order to enforce real-time
behavior of some real-time (RT) tasks. RT tasks were deﬁned as special Linux
loadable kernel modules (LKMs), so they run inside the kernel. The scheduler
was changed to handle these tasks in a preemptive way and to be conﬁgurable
to diﬀerent scheduling disciplines. Linux runs as the lowest priority task and
its interruption scheme was changed to be intercepted by RT-Linux. Real-time
FIFOs are the basic mechanism for communication between and with RT tasks.
From the point of view of protection, RT-Linux is very similar to Linux.
One of the main vulnerabilities is the existence of the superuser privileges. The
superuser controls all system resources: it can read, modify and delete any ﬁle,
any position of memory, etc. Most attacks against Unix/Linux machines at some
step try —and often manage — to obtain superuser privileges. This is often
achievable, e.g., attacking programs with setuid [8], using race conditions [10]
or buﬀer overﬂows [17].
Recently several Linux extensions and packages appeared that try to handle
this problem, limiting the power of the superuser. We use the Linux capabilities
since they are already part of the kernel [1].
Linux capabilities are extensions of the Posix capabilities, which are privi-
leges or access control lists (ACLs) associated with processes, allowing to con-
trol how they can manipulate objects, i.e., other processes, ﬁles, directories,
unnamed pipes, memory, and the system clock.
When the system reboots, process init has the full set of capabilities, and
handles the alocation of capabilities to all other processes. This is done through
a capability bounding set, containing the capabilities that can be held by pro-
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cesses in the system. After a capability is removed from that set, it cannot be
used by any process in the system until the next reboot, not even by a process
with superuser privileges. The capability bounding set can thus be used auto-
matically, during reboot, to permanently limit the privileges of processes until
the next reboot. This mechanisms is very limited since it allows only a resource
to be enabled or disabled for all processes/users. However, it can still be useful
for our purposes.
Enforcing environment assumptions
Assumptions A1 and A2 impose the only limits on what the attacker can do
inside a host. It can do everything else. We assume that it can access the host,
run software there, and become root or run processes with superuser privileges3.
The protection mechanisms mentioned in A1 are basically a set of commands
in a script that remove a set of Linux capabilities from the capability bounding
set. This script is executed when the host is rebooted. Therefore, assumption
A1 is secured preventing hackers from rebooting the system. This can be done
either protecting the access to the host or using a reboot password.
Assumption A2 protects the working space of both the RT-Linux kernel
and the RT task supporting the TTCB. If the attacker manages to modify the
kernel memory, he has a dramatic potential for damage, which ranges from
modifying kernel or TTCB code or state, to arbitrarily controlling any of the
system components, since code in the kernel memory can execute privileged
CPU instructions.
Assumption A2 is enforced by removing two vulnerabilities. The removal of
these vulnerabilities reduces the power of the superuser and consequently, the
power of the attacker:
3This discussion concerns the environment during runtime. We have also to prevent the
kernel and the local TTCB binaries from being corrupted by an attacker. The ﬁles can
either be ROM-based, or their integrity can be checked whenever the system reboots with an
application such as Tripwire.
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Loadable kernel modules:
• Loadable kernel modules (LKMs) are the standard way of inserting code in the
kernel in runtime. Their insertion and removal is restricted to the superuser
but, since we consider that the attacker can become superuser, it is a vul-
nerability. This vulnerability is removed taking the capability CAP SYS MODULE
oﬀ the capability bounding set. The local TTCB has to insert one LKM and
several real-time tasks (that are also LKMs) in the kernel. This has to be done
during reboot, before the capability is removed from the bounding set.
/dev/mem and /dev/kmem devices:
• The devices /dev/mem and /dev/kmem allow an attacker with superuser privi-
leges to change code and data in the kernel. This can be used to change the
kernel and local TTCB code and state. This is even more serious since the ﬁle
System.map maps kernel symbols to physical addresses. An example of how
this can be used to corrupt the kernel is a vulnerability that was found on the
implementation of the capability bounding set itself. The physical address of
this variable has the symbol cap bset. A simple grep of System.map allows one
to get the physical address of the variable and a simple write in the memory
allows the modiﬁcation of the bounding set value. These devices can even be
used to insert code in the kernel [14]. This vulnerability is removed disabling
access to the two devices. This is done by removing CAP SYS RAWIO from the
capability bounding set.
Assumption A3 says that hypothetical accidental faults do not aﬀect the
normal behavior of the host except by crashing it. The stability of Linux is
such that we consider it a given. The assumption makes sense since kernel
instability on account of these faults (e.g., memory bit corruptions, processor
bugs, user process misbehavior) has a very low probability of occurring.
Assumptions A4 through A7 refer to the control channel. Assumption A4
stipulates that an attacker cannot access the control network adapter from inside
the host, and in consequence, he can neither send to, nor read and/or intercept
packets from, the control network. This is secured by ensuring the interposition
principle for the relevant LAN controller: it must depend solely on the TTCB
RT task. However, Linux capabilities cannot help here. Therefore, we deﬁne two
algorithms, respectively for write and read. The algorithms are implemented in
the control channel network device driver:
Write algorithm:
• When a local TTCB sends a packet to the network device driver, an unforge-
able tag is appended to the packet (a random number); the tag is stored in a
table (in the kernel memory).
• When the device driver gets a packet to be sent to the network it looks at the
tag; if the tag is stored in the table it sends the packet and removes the tag
from the table; if it is not, it discards the packet.
Read algorithm:
• Before reading a packet the local TTCB stores an unforgeable tag in a table
(in the kernel memory); when it calls the device driver to read a packet it gives
the device driver the tag;
• When the device driver gets a request to read a packet it checks the tag; if the
tag is the one previously stored the driver returns a packet and removes the
tag from the table; otherwise it returns an error.
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Assumption A5, on the other hand, is secured by ensuring that an attacker
cannot have physical access to the control network medium devices (cables,
switches, etc.). The assumption makes sense if we consider that it is a short-
range, inside-premises closed network, connecting a set of servers inside a single
institution, with no other connection. We are assuming that the attacker comes
from the Internet, through the payload network, without physical access to the
servers or control network hardware. Long-range solutions also use technologies
such as ISDN VPN or GSM/UMTS, that are hard for the common Internet
intruder to tamper with in conjunction with an attack through the payload
network. Note however that assumption A5 can still be enforced for a more
powerful hacker who can eavesdrop on the control channel, by using crypto-
graphic schemes in the inter-TTCB communication.
In the just assumed absence of active attacks on the control channel, assump-
tions A6 and A7 establish limits to the events that may aﬀect the timeliness of
communication on the former, so that known bounds can be derived on message
delivery delays, and failure detection can be accurately performed. Networks
can be tested in order to ﬁnd out the maximum number of packets they may
corrupt in an interval of time, the omission degree. Likewise, short-range LANs
have negligible partitioning, which can be further improved by using redundant
channels, a must to enforce A7 in wider-area networks.
The TTCB can be considered as having one component, the control channel,
plus several components of the same type, local TTCBs (Figure 1). In the
following sections, we discuss the design of the Abstract Network modeling the
control channel, and of the local TTCB.
10 Abstract Network Design
The design of the TTCB control channel must secure the Abstract Network
properties listed earlier in Table 1. Let us discuss the necessary adaptation
mechanisms to secure some of these properties.
Property AN1 is available in the Ethernet and can be simulated with IP
multicast or with several sends in other networks. Property AN2 is imposed
by most networks, through the cyclic redundancy check (CRC), if no attacks
on the network are considered (assumption A5). In case of attacks, message
integrity checks (MICs) could be used instead. Property AN3 is guaranteed
by the environment assumption A6. A typical value for Od during a protocol
execution in short-range LANs is Od = 1.
For property AN4 to be guaranteed in a dedicated switched Fast-Ethernet,
packet collisions have to be avoided, since they would cause unpredictable delays.
This requires: (1) only one host can be connected to each switch port (hubs
cannot be used); and (2) the traﬃc load has to be controlled. This traﬃc
control has to avoid a set of bounds from being exceeded: the switch buﬀering
and switching capacities; the buﬀering capacity of the network boards used by
the local TTCBs; and the network bandwidth. This requirement is achieved
in the TTCB since it executes an admission control mechanism whenever the
execution of a service is requested, in order to secure timeliness.
Property AN5 is guaranteed by the assumption A7. Property AN6 depends
on several factors having to do with the transmission technology, and medium
topology. The value of Bd has to be chosen taking these factors in account. In
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the network we are considering, a switched Fast-Ethernet, the broadcast degree
can easily exceed half of the nodes. Properties AN7 and AN8 are guaranteed by
assumptions A4 and A5 and could be enhanced using common cryptographic
schemes.
11 Local TTCB Design
This section discusses a few issues related with the implementation of local (i.e.,
non-distributed) services in the RT-Linux TTCB. The local TTCB executive or
runtime support environment has real-time behavior: it is able to schedule and
timely execute real-time tasks, as long as some pre-deﬁned schedulability con-
ditions are respected. Assumptions A1 and A2 provide a notion of protection.
Assumption A3 implies that accidental faults may only crash the local TTCB.
We recall that the software architecture of the local TTCB encompasses
security and time services (Table 2). The TTCB API is deﬁned as a set of
functions. The functions are deﬁned in a library and communicate with the
local TTCB using RT-Linux FIFOs. Each call is transformed in two messages:
a request and an reply. The mechanism is similar to remote procedure calls.
The local TTCB is implemented by a kernel module (LKM) and by a number
of real-time tasks (RT tasks). The LKM handles calls from the entities (i.e., from
the library). The LKM is not real-time since it is part of the interface of the
TTCB. All operations with timeliness constrains are executed by RT tasks. A
local TTCB has always at least two RT tasks that handle communication: one
to send messages to the other local TTCBs and another to receive and process
incoming messages. Some services use additional RT tasks. This is the case for
the Timely Execution service whose purpose is precisely to execute tasks during
a user deﬁned intervals of time. The Timing Failure Detection service may also
execute a RT task if a timing failure occurs [43] (see Table 2). The random
numbers returned by the TTCB cannot be guessed by an attacker due to the
environment assumption A2.
12 Related Work
The TTCB is a distributed security kernel [3] which is radically diﬀerent from
the classic Trusted Computing Base (TCB) [42]. The objective of the Trusted
Computing Base is to provide intrusion prevention for all critical software in the
host; the TTCB, on the contrary, is supposed to be the only secure component
and to support the implementation of distributed fault- and intrusion-tolerant
protocols. Some secure communication systems assume that the host has a
TCB that includes the system software and the OS [37, 4]. Other systems
are based on Byzantine protocols and are intrusion-tolerant [13, 26, 36, 2, 19].
In another paper we show how the TTCB can be used to implement eﬃcient
intrusion-tolerant protocols [15].
The idea of using a secure device to assist the implementation of secure ap-
plications is not new. The Trusted Computing Platform Alliance (TCPA) is
deﬁning a secure subsystem that provides some local security services to the ap-
plications [40]. Project Dyad explored the use of the Citadel secure coprocessor
to implement a number of secure distributed applications [41]. Several papers
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describe the use of SmartCards with the same generic purpose [25, 38, 39]. Al-
though this paper describes the implementation of the (local) TTCB in software,
it could also be implemented inside devices like secure coprocessors or Smart-
Cards. Moreover, the TTCB is a distributed component and therefore it can
support and assist distributed applications in a more eﬀective way [15]. The
TTCB is also real-time, so it can assist the execution of applications with time
requirements.
The implementation of the TTCB based on removing vulnerabilities from
the operating system, builds on several taxonomies of vulnerabilities [28, 5].
Several Linux extensions and packages appeared recently in order to handle the
problem of the Unix superuser “omnipotence”. Several of these packages are
based on the now withdrawn draft standard IEEE 1003.1e (Posix.1e) [24] and
provide mechanisms to implement the least privilege principle: processes should
run with the minimum privileges required to accomplish their purpose. Some of
these packages are: Linux capabilities [1], LIDS [23], Immunix SubDomain [16],
LOMAC [21], VXE [30], Security-Enhanced Linux [29]. We used the Linux
capabilities since they come with Linux and provide the functionality we need.
Also, installing two patches in the same kernel (RT-Linux and the security
package) can be complex and version dependent.
The TTCB builds on the Timely Computing Base work [43]. The objective
of this distributed component it to assist the implementation of timed operations
and to detect timing failures. It assumes a benign failure model, i.e., on the
contrary to the TTCB it does not consider malicious faults. The TTCB provides
not only all the functionality of the Timely Computing Base, but also additional
security-related services.
The Agreement Service protocol is basically a Consensus protocol with the
possibility of selecting the decision function and with the two additional masks
in the result (see for instance [22]). Synchronous reliable multicast protocols are
known for a long time [6, 7, 18]. Although these protocols assume a synchronous
model, some are not timely. Also, they rely on diﬀusing the messages that
are received to all the other recipients in order to guarantee reliability. The
implementation of the Timely Computing Base gave us the insight that the
network bandwidth is a very limited resource, if we want it to behave in real-
time, so we designed our protocol without echos/diﬀusion (every message is
broadcasted only once).
13 Conclusions and Future Work
The paper describes the design of a security kernel – the TTCB – with innovative
features: ﬁrst, it is distributed, with local parts in each node connected by a
control channel; second, it is real-time capable of timely behavior; and third, it
can be constructed using only COTS components. The paper also presents the
services of the TTCB and gives an intuition on how these services can be used
to support the construction of a new generation of timely and secure protocols.
The ﬁrst two protocols of this class are described in [15].
The current architecture of the TTCB is based on mainstream hardware
running a real-time operating system, RT-Linux, and on a Fast-Ethernet net-
work. By applying our design methodology, we expect that the existing im-
plementation exhibits a good coverage of the assumptions, acceptable to most
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applications. This solution has one extra added advantage – the TTCB can be
tested and used in open settings.
In the future, we are considering the implementation of the TTCB inside
an appliance board. A version of RT-Linux for embedded systems is already
available, which leads us to predict that the port will be straight forward. The
second area of future work is in the development of new timed secure protocols.
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A Proofs of the Protocols
This appendix gives concise proofs of theorems and lemmas about the Local Authen-
tication Service, the Agreement Service and Timely Reliable Broadcast protocols.
A.1 Local Authentication Service Protocol
This section is about the Local Authentication Service protocol in Figure 3.
Theorem 1 The Local Authentication Service protocol is an authenticated key estab-
lishment protocol.
Proof sketch. The protocol is an authenticated key establishment protocol if it veriﬁes SK1
through SK4.
SK1. The protocol veriﬁes SK1 since the key is passed only in the ﬁrst message and only
the local TTCB has the private key that can decrypt this message, 〈Eu(Ket, Xe)〉.
SK2. The proof of SK2 can be divided in two parts. The entity knows that the local
TTCB has the key because it gave it (ﬁrst message) and receives back a conﬁrmation that
cannot be falsiﬁed since it is obtained with the local TTCB private key (second message).
The local TTCB knows that the entity has the key since it was the entity that gave the key
to the local TTCB (ﬁrst message).
SK3. is also veriﬁed since the entity gives the TTCB a message that only the TTCB can
decrypt, 〈Eu(Ket, Xe)〉, and the TTCB gives back the decrypted challenge, Xe, showing that
it was able to do the decryption.
SK4. Property SK4 primarily depends on the key generation method and encryption
algorithm. We assume that the entity or the TTCB generate keys that verify that property.
SK4 is guaranteed by the protocol since a key does not depend on a previous one. ✷
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A.2 Agreement Service Protocol
This section is about the Agreement Service protocol in Figure 4.
Theorem 2 If the Agreement Service is implemented with the Agreement Service pro-
tocol and there are no local TTCB crashes then it veriﬁes Termination, Integrity,
Agreement and Validity.
Proof sketch. All local TTCBs broadcast the values proposed locally to all others. All
receive and process the same values since there are no crashes and the protocol tolerates
omissions in the network. The result is obtained applying a deterministic function to the
values received. Therefore, all local TTCBs obtain the same result.
Termination. A correct entity eventually calls decide to obtain the result of the agreement.
Since all local TTCBs obtain the result, every correct entity eventually decides a result.
Integrity. A entity that calls decide more than once and obtains the result more than
once, obtains always the same result. Therefore, every correct entity decides at most one
value.
Agreement. All local TTCBs obtain the same result so all correct entities decide the same.
Validity. The result is obtained in the local TTCBs applying the function decision to the
values proposed. If a correct entity decides, then it decides that value obtained by the local
TTCBs. ✷
Theorem 3 The Agreement Service protocol veriﬁes Timeliness and Tagreement is
given by:
Tagreement = Ts +WCETsend + Tsend + Tr +WCETreceive + π (4)
Proof sketch. WCETsend and WCETreceive are respectively the worst case execution
times of the send and receive routines. Any value proposed after tstart is not accepted for
the agreement (Line 2). After the value is introduced in sendTable, the broadcast routine
takes less than Ts to start to run, so the message with the value will not be broadcasted after
(tstart + Ts +WCETsend) (Lines 8-9). The message will take at most Tsend to arrive to
the local TTCBs and the receive routine may take at the most Tr to start to run. Then the
message will take less than WCETreceive to be received and processed (Lines 11-15). The
factor π takes in account the local TTCB clocks de-synchronization that leads to a diﬀerent
assessment of tstart in diﬀerent local TTCBs. Adding all these maximum delays, we have the
Formula 4. Since there is a Tagreement the protocol has the property of Timeliness. ✷
A.3 Agreement Service Protocol With Local TTCB Crashes
This section is about the crash-tolerant Agreement Service protocol and the Timely
Reliable Broadcast protocol in Figure 5.
Lemma 1 The Timely Reliable Broadcast protocol veriﬁes the properties of Validity,
Agreement and Integrity if there are no local TTCB crashes.
Proof sketch. Validity. A correct (non-crashed) local TTCB receives the messages that it R-
broadcasts. If it R-broadcast M(s, n) then it receives M(s, n). After M(s, n) it R-broadcasts
M(s, n + 1), M(s, n + 2), etc. After receiving M(s, n), when it eventually receives M(s, n+)
it R-delivers M(s, n), ∀n+ : n+ > n.
Agreement. If a correct local TTCB R-delivers M(s, n), then it received M(s, n) and a
message in one of the two conditions tested in Line 9. Since we are not considering crashes
and we assume that omissions in the network are tolerated, all local TTCBs receive those two
messages and R-deliver M(s, n).
Integrity. The property of Integrity means that no spurious messages are R-delivered.
This is a consequence of AN2 and AN8. ✷
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Lemma 2 The Timely Reliable Broadcast protocol tolerates a single local TTCB crash
in an interval of time (not assuming AN6).
Proof sketch. If a local TTCB crashes during the R-broadcast of M(s, n + 1), and no
local TTCB receives it, no local TTCB R-delivers M(s, n). If at least a single local TTCB
receives M(s, n+1) it R-delivers M(s, n) (ﬁrst condition on Line 9) and, in the next message
that it R-broadcasts, it will say to all the other local TTCBs that it received M(s, n + 1)
(higherseqVector[s]=n+1 ) and they will also R-deliver M(s, n) (second condition in Line 28).
Now, let us show that the protocol does not tolerate two or more crashes. Suppose that the
local TTCB s crashed and a single local TTCB received M(s, n+1). Then, the local TTCB
that received the message started to R-broadcast a message with higherseqVector[s]=n+1. If
it also crashed during that R-broadcast, some local TTCBs could receive conﬁrmations while
other did not; this would cause some local TTCBs to R-deliver M(s, n), while others would
not. Therefore, the protocol tolerates a single local TTCB crash during a reliable broadcast.
✷
Theorem 4 The Timely Reliable Broadcast protocol tolerates Bd local TTCB crashes
(assuming AN6).
Proof sketch. Consider that the local TTCB s starts R-broadcasting M(s, n + 1) and
crashes. The worst case happens when just Bd local TTCBs receive the message. We want
to prove that the protocol tolerates Bd crashes. Since the sender already crashed only Bd− 1
local TTCBs can still crash. Therefore, of Bd local TTCBs that received the message at least
one does not crash and sends higherseqVector[s]=n+1 in the next message it R-broadcasts.
All non-crashed TTCBs receive that R-broadcast and R-deliver M(s, n). ✷
Theorem 5 The Timely Reliable Broadcast protocol has the property of Timeliness
and the constant Tbroadcast is given by:
Tbroadcast = (WCETsend + Tsend + Tr +WCETreceive) + (Ts) +
(Ts +WCETsend + Tsend + Tr +WCETreceive) + π (5)
Proof sketch. The ﬁrst component of this delay is the maximum time for the local TTCBs to
receive the message R-broadcasted, M(s, n) (ﬁrst pair of brackets). The sender sends the next
message, M(s, n + 1), Ts after M(s, n). Therefore, the ﬁrst two components of the formula
give the maximum time for the local TTCBs to receive M(s, n+ 1). The third component of
the formula gives the extra time for the non-crashed local TTCBs to receive a message with
n + 1 associated with s and to R-deliver M(s, n). If there is a constant Tbroadcast then the
protocol has the property of Timeliness. ✷
Theorem 6 For the crash-tolerant Agreement Service Protocol, Tagreement is given
by:
Tagreement = Ts + Tbroadcast (6)
Proof sketch. After the last entity proposes or tstart expires, the Agreement Service takes
at most a send period Ts to R-broadcast the last propose. Then, all local TTCBs take at
most Tbroadcast to R-deliver the message. ✷
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B Complete Agreement Service Protocol
This appendix shows the complete Agreement Service protocol that combines the
protocols in Figures 4 and 5.
For each local TTCB
propose routine
1 when entity calls TTCB propose(eid, elist, tstart, decision, value) do
2 if (entity already proposed) or (eid /∈ elist) or (clock() > tstart) then return error;
3 insert (elist, tstart, decision, eid, value) in sendTable;
4 get R ∈ dataTable : R.elist = elist ∧ R.tstart = tstart ∧ R.decision = decision;
5 if (R = ⊥) then R := (get tag(), elist, tstart, decision, ⊥); insert R in dataTable;
6 return R.tag;
broadcast routine
7 when clock() = rounds × Ts do
8 sender := my id(); seq := rounds;
9 M := (sender, seq, higherseqVector, sendTable);
10 repeat Od+ 1 times do broadcast(M);
11 sendTable := ⊥; rounds := rounds + 1;
receive routine
12 when clock() = roundr × Tr do
13 while (read(M) = error) do
14 foreach M-ndlv in notDelivered do
15 if [(M-ndlv.sender = M.sender) and (M-ndlv.number < M.number)] or
(M-ndlv.number < M.higherseqVector[M-ndlv.sender]) then
16 R-deliver(M-ndlv.sendTable); remove M-ndlv from notDelivered;
17 if (higherseqVector[M.sender] > M.number) then R-deliver(M.sendTable);
18 else put M in notDelivered; higherseqVector[M.sender] := M.number;
19 roundr := roundr + 1;
R-deliver routine (sendTable-in)
20 foreach (elist, tstart, decision, eid, value) ∈ sendTable-in do
21 get R ∈ dataTable : R.elist = elist ∧ R.tstart = tstart ∧ R.decision = decision;
22 if (R = ⊥) then R := (get tag(), elist, tstart, decision, ⊥); insert R in dataTable;
23 insert value in R.vtable;
24 return;
decide routine
25 when entity calls TTCB decide(tag) do
26 get R ∈ dataTable : R.tag = tag;
27 if (R = ⊥) and [(clock() > R.tstart + Tagreement) or
28 (all entities in non-crashed local TTCBs proposed a value)] then
29 return (calculate result using function R.decision and values in R.vtable);
30 else return error;
Figure 7: Crash-Tolerant Agreement Service internal protocol. Instance at a local
TTCB.
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